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ARTICLES
Patenting Life in the European
Community: The Proposed Directive
on the Legal Protection for
Biotechnological Inventions
Janice McCoy'
INTRODUCTION
Technology has once again overtaken the law. Ever since the
United States Supreme Court concluded in 1980 that anything un-
der the sun that was made by man could be patented,' and especial-
ly since the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO")
announced in 1987 that it considered nonnaturally occurring non-
human animals to be patentable subject matter,2 legislative bodies
in both the United States and the European Economic Community
("EEC") have been debating to what extent living matter should be
patentable. Not only have animal patents3 been granted,4 but appli-
* University of Texas at Austin, B.J. 1966, M.A. 1969; St. Mary's University School
of Law, J.D. 1973; Golden Gate University School of Law, LL.M. (Tax) 1980; Fordham
University School of Law, LL.M. (International Business & Trade) 1993.
1. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
2. Notice by the Commissioner, 1077 Pat. & Trademark Off. Gazette 24 (Apr. 21,
1987), reprinted in 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 664 (Apr. 23, 1987).
3. Potentially patentable animals are transgenic animals produced by recombinant
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) technique or genetic engineering. Transgenic animals are
those to whose DNA, or hereditary material, has been added DNA from different animals
or from humans. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: PATENTING LIFE 93-94 (1989).
4. Onco-mouse/Harvard, Decision of 3 April 1992, (1992] O.J. EUR. PATENT OFF.
[O.J.E.P.O.] 568 (Examining Div.), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 106, E-
35, acq., Case T-19/90, [1990] O.J.E.P.O. 12/476 (Tech. Bd. App. 1990), reprinted in 5
Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 103, T 19/90-1, rev'g and remanding, Decision of 14 July
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cations for patents for human gene fragments5 have been filed both
in the United States by the U.S. National Institutes of Health
("NIH",)6 and in the United Kingdom.7 The USPTO has rejected
the human gene fragment applications submitted by NIH for failure
to meet minimum U.S. patent law requirements of usefulness and
non-obviousness.8 However, NIH is confident it can answer the
USPTO's concerns. 9
1989, [1989] O.J.E.P.O. 11/451 (Examining Div.), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook
(MB), ch. 106, E-17; U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866, 1089 OFmiciAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. 703
(Apr. 12, 1988).
The so-called "Harvard mouse" U.S. patent claim is actually for any species of
"transgenic nonhuman mammal, all of whose germ cells [reproductive cells] and somatic
cells [cells that become tissues, organs, etc.] contain a recombinant activated oncogene
sequence (genetic information that makes the animal susceptible to cancerous tumors]
introduced into said mammal, or an ancestor of said mammal, at an embryonic stage."
U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866, 1089 Om'xcIAL GAz. PAT. OFF. 703 (Apr. 12, 1988). In
January 1993, a second animal patent was issued to researchers at Ohio State University
for a strain of mice carrying a human gene that makes them resistant to viral infection.
Virus-Resistant Mouse to Receive a Patent, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at D2.
5. As part of the work on the Human Genome Project, an international effort to map
and sequence all of the human genes, a researcher at the U.S. National Institutes of Health
developed a technique of identifying genes on the basis of DNA sequences. See Gina
Kolata, Biologist's Speedy Gene Method Scares Peers But Gains Backer, N.Y. TIMES, July
28, 1992, at Cl.
6. In 1991, NIH filed patent applications with the USPTO for some 2,400 fragments
of human genes. Malcolm Gladwell, Clarifying Patent Law for Genes; Hill Asked to
Settle 'Prior Publication,' WASH. PoST, Sept. 24, 1992, at A27.
7. In July 1992, the U.K. Medical Research Council filed its own applications with
the U.K. Patent Office for about 1,100 human gene fragments in retaliation for NIH's
filing and to secure its bargaining position should the NIH applications succeed. Celia
Hampton & Simon Cohen, A Patent for Dr. Frankenstein, FIN. TIMS, Aug. 14, 1992, at
8; see also Gladwell, supra note 6.
8. Warren E. Leary, Health Counsel Opposes New Gene Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 1992, at B26. In testimony to Congress on September 22, 1992, Dr. Bernadine Healy,
then Director of the NIH, told Congress that the USPTO, in rejecting an application by
NIH to patent thousands of gene fragments that NIH researchers had identified, ques-
tioned granting patent protection to gene fragments whose uses are unknown and conclud-
ed that the application did not meet the requirement for nonobviousness. Id.
9. It is unclear to what extent the NIH claims will be prosecuted. The then general
counsel of the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") had ad-
vised NIH not to pursue the patent applications. However, the final decision to pursue
the claim is up to the Secretary of HHS. Dr. Bernadine Healy asked Congress to take
action on the issue of the patenting of human genes. Id. Since then, Bill Clinton has
been elected President and Dr. Donna E. Shalala has been named Secretary of HHS. Dr.
Healy resigned from NIH on June 30, 1993. Reynolds Holding, Nobel Prize Winner from
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In the wake of the debate over the patentability of living organ-
isms, the Commission of the European Communities ("Commis-
sion") has proposed to the Council of Ministers ("Council") a Di-
rective on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions
(,"Proposed Directive"). 0 On October 29, 1992, the European Par-
liament ("Parliament") voted to approve the Proposed Directive
subject to its amendments." On December 16, 1992, the Commis-
sion submitted to the Council its amended proposal for a directive
("Amended Proposed Directive"). 2
This Article examines the patentability of living organisms,
including human material, under Chapter 1 of the Proposed Direc-
tive. Part I reviews the economic issues that were the impetus for
the Proposed Directive and the legal context that framed the Direc-
tive's scope, including international agreements and the European
Patent Office decision on patenting animals. Part II examines eco-
San Francisco in Running for Top NIH Post, S.F. CHRON., June 17, 1993, at A13. As
of this writing, the policy of the current administration on this issue has not been an-
nounced.
10. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions, 0.. C 10/3 (1989) [hereinafter Proposed Directive].
11. Legislative Resolution No. A3-0286/92, O.J. C 305/173-74 (1992).
12. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechno-
logical Inventions O.J. C 44/36 (1993) [hereinafter Amended Proposed Directive]. The
Council must now reach a "common position," by qualified majority, to submit to Parlia-
ment for a second reading. Parliament has three months in which to accept, amend, or
reject the Council's common position. If Parliament accepts or takes no action, the
Council adopts the proposal as found in its common position. If Parliament amends, the
Commission has one month in which it may again amend the proposal, thereafter called
the "re-examined proposal." Within the next three months, the Council must adopt the
Directive or else it lapses. There must be a qualified majority if it adopts the Commis-
sion's re-examined proposal without changes. It must act with unanimity if it amends the
Commission's re-examined proposal. If Parliament rejects the Council's common position
at the second reading, then the Council can only adopt the proposal by unanimous vote.
See generally AUDREY WINTER ET AL., EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A LAWYER'S
GuiDE (1989).
The Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 03.. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 ("Maastricht Treaty"), entered into force on November 1, 1993. This
proposal will henceforth be considered under the new "co-decision" procedure. For a
general discussion of EEC legislative procedure, see Ronald E. Myrick, Influences Affect-
ing the Licensing of Rights in a Unitary European Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.,
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 81, 90-92.
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nomic and ethical issues that concerned Parliament when it pro-
posed amendments with respect to the patentability of living matter
under the Proposed Directive. Part M analyzes the attempt in the
Amended Proposed Directive to reconcile Parliament's concerns
with the goal of achieving competitive parity with the United
States. This Part also explores the Amended Proposed Directive's
failure to adequately address the reservations about patenting hu-
man materials. Some such reservations are based on economic
concerns that the patent system may permit monopolistic powers
derived from broad patent claims to choke off the flow of develop-
ments. Accordingly, the Article suggests that, given the uncertain-
ties in this area in both the United States and the EEC, an interna-
tional agreement would be the most effective way to satisfy eco-
nomic concerns. This Article concludes that the Amended Pro-
posed Directive's specific definitions and minimum standards will
provide greater certainty in determining what is patentable and thus
help to strengthen the EEC's domestic biotechnology industry.
I. PATENT PROTECTION AS AN ELEMENT OF ECONOMIC POLICY
The granting of a patent for an invention is regarded as an
incentive to invest in and carry out research and development.' 3 At
the same time, granting a patent promotes early disclosure of new
advances in technology and makes an invention part of the general
information system of society upon which further industrial devel-
opment can be based.'4
According to at least one commentator, biotechnology15 is con-
13. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146-51 (1989);
Friedrich-Karl Beier & Joseph Straus, Patents in a Time of Rapid Scientific and Techno-
logical Change: Inventions in Biotechnology, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PATENT PROTEC-
TION 15, 17 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 1985).
14. Id.
15. For purposes of the Proposed Directive, biotechnology is understood to comprise
all the techniques that use or cause organic changes in any biological material (such as
animal and plant cells or cell lines, enzymes, plasmids and viruses), microorganisms,
plants, and animals; or that cause changes in inorganic material by biological means.
Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions,
COM(88)496 final-SYN 159 at 7-8 [hereinafter Commission Memorandum]. It includes
the techniques of recombinant DNA, gene transfer, embryo manipulation and transfer,
[V/ol. 4:501
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sidered the third technological revolution of this century, preceded
only by nuclear energy and information technology.' 6 Perhaps its
earliest and greatest impact has been in the pharmaceutical and
health care industry, with the production of human insulin,
interferons for the treatment of cancer, tissue plasminogen activa-
tors for the dissolution of blood clots, and hundreds of diagnostic
tests capable of detecting diseases. 7 In plant and animal agricul-
ture, biotechnology is expected to improve food production by
increasing the growth rates and growth efficiency of animals and
by creating plants resistant to diseases, insects, and herbicides."
Patent protection and public acceptance are conditions critical to
the diffusion of biotechnology throughout society. 9 Both of these
topics are at the center of the debate in Europe at the present time.
In 1985, when the Commission presented its program for com-
pleting a single, integrated Common Market for the European Com-
munity by 1992,20 its recommendations for the removal of technical
barriers to trade in goods included measures for the patent protec-
tion of biotechnological inventions.2' Differences in intellectual
property laws were seen as having a direct and negative impact on
intra-Community trade and on the ability of businesses to treat the
common market as a single environment for their activities.22
In 1988, the Commission sought to establish clear and im-
proved standards for the protection of biotechnological inventions
by issuing the Proposed Directive.23 The Commission intended to
plant regeneration, cell culture, monoclonal antibodies, and bioprocess engineering. Id.
16. Alan T. Bull et al., Developments Since the 1982 OECD Report, Biotechnology:
International Trends and Perspectives, in BIOTECHNOLOGY-ECONOMIC AND WIDER
IMPACTs 22 (OECD 1989).
17. Id. at 23.
18. Id. at 24-25.
19. Id. at 57; see, e.g., BIOTECHNOLOGY AND CHANGING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
(OECD 1988); 1992-PLANNING FOR CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS, AND BIOTECHNOL-
OGY (Int'l Bus. Intelligence 1989).
20. Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market:
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(85)310 final.
21. Id. at 37.
22. Id.
23. Commission Memorandum, supra note 15, at 6.
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facilitate the development of the EEC's biotechnology industry and
trade in biotechnological products, as well as enable the EEC's
industries to keep pace with leading nations in biotechnology and
to close or narrow existing gaps with a harmonized system of pat-
ent law.24
Eliminating barriers to the exchange of knowledge and technol-
ogy transfers between Member States, and to trade in the EEC by
providing harmonized protection of biotechnological inventions
would be an incentive for investments throughout the EEC.2 In
addition, the Proposed Directive would contribute to trade among
Member States hampered (without the Directive) "by the fact that
export of self-reproducible biotechnological products into areas
with uncertain, weak or even non-existent protection is less than
attractive. 26 Furthermore, EEC industries would be more likely to
repatriate their funds, previously invested overseas, in research and
development.27 Finally, investors from other countries "would be
more inclined to invest in the EEC.
'28
The importance of biotechnology patent protection to the econ-
omy of the EEC was emphasized in a Commission communication
on April 18, 1991.29 The Commission identified three problem
areas to be addressed in order to improve the competitiveness of
the EEC's biotechnology industry: (1) inadequate patent protec-
tion; (2) a fragmented market; and (3) public concern with ethical
24. Id. The United States and Japan were perceived as having been able to adapt
their patent protection according to the latest needs of industry. Id. at 22. The Commis-
sion was not alone in viewing intellectual property protection as a key factor in fostering
competitive industries. See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, Bio-
TECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 203 (1991).
25. Commission Memorandum, supra note 15, at 22.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Commission proposes programme to strengthen European biotechnology, New
Developments, [1991-1993 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) i 95,877 (1991).
The communication noted the impact of biotechnology on various sectors of society,
including food production, health, and environmental protection. It also pointed out the
volume of world-wide sales (European Currency Unit 7,500m in 1985) and the number
of persons presently employed in the EEC in the sector (fifteen million). Id.
[Vol. 4:501
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issues.30 Emphasizing that enterprises will only invest in high-risk,
long-term projects if intellectual property law guarantees adequate
protection for the results of research, the Commission set a high
priority on its proposals to ensure that biotechnology products fall
within the scope of patent protection.
II. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSED DmECrVE
A. The Strasbourg and European Patent Conventions
The 1963 Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of
Substantive Law on Patents for Inventions ("Strasbourg Conven-
tion") was aimed at unifying substantive patent law in Europe.32
It set out the basic requirements for the patentability of an inven-
tion; that is, it must have industrial application, must be new, and
must involve an inventive step.33 The Strasbourg Convention also
provided that contracting states did not have to grant patents for
inventions which would be contrary to public order or morality34 or
"plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the
production of plants or animals," although this last provision did
not apply to microbiological processes and products.35 Thus, the
Strasbourg Convention allowed contracting states to exclude from
patent protection inventions that were contrary to public order or
morality, plant and animal varieties, or "essentially biological pro-
cesses for the production of plants or animals," but not to exclude
microbiological processes and products.
The background documents to the Strasbourg Convention do
not provide much information on the reasons for the exclusions
from the patent harmonization effort for inventions in animal
breeding; however, neither economic arguments nor ethical consid-
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents
for Inventions, Strasbourg, Nov. 27, 1963, Eur. T.S. No. 47, reprinted in 3 Eur. Pat.
Handbook (MB), ch. 92 [hereinafter Strasbourg Convention].
33. Id. art. 1.
34. Id. art. 2(a).
35. Id. art. 2(b).
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erations seem to have played any major role. 36 Although certain
writers justify the exclusion of animal varieties and "essentially
biological" inventions as corollary to the exclusion of inventions
contrary to public order or morality, most argue against the exclu-
sion with respect to animal breeding.37 The exclusion of animal
varieties and "essentially biological processes" for breeding animals
has been attributed to the fact that the conventional forms of patent
protection were not considered suitable for biological processes and
products.3 8 Thus, the provision may have been influenced by the
concept that special protection schemes, along the lines of the plant
variety protection system established two years earlier under the
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants,39
were more appropriate.4°
Further legal uncertainty is caused by the difficulty in drawing
an exact borderline between patentable microbiological processes
and unpatentable "essentially biological processes.",4' For instance,
with regard to the effect of this provision on patents for genetic
engineering, it has been argued: (1) that the whole field of genetics
is biological and that all genetic processes and methods are essen-
tially biological processes, and thus unpatentable; 42 (2) that a genet-
ic invention is not essentially biological if an "important part" of
the process relies on physical or chemical means, and thus a case-
36. Rainer Moufang, Patentability of Genetic Inventions in Animals, 20 INT'L. REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. [I.I.C.] 823, 830 (1989).
37. Id. at 831.
38. Volker Vossius, Patent Protection forAnimals; Onco-mouse/HARVARD, 12 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. [E.I.P.R.] 250, 253 (1990). However, six years later the Federal Su-
preme Court of Germany acknowledged the patentability of processes for breeding ani-
mals in the landmark decision Rote Taube (Red Dove). Judgment of Mar. 27, 1969,
(Rote Taube/Red Dove), Bundespatentgericht (BPatG) (F.R.G.), excerpts translated in 1
l.I.C. 136 (1970).
39. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2,
1961, as revised, Geneva, Oct. 23, 1978, 33 U.S.T. 2703 [hereinafter UPOV Treaty]. The
UPOV Treaty was recently amended and opened for signature in Geneva on Mar. 19,
1991 ("Amended UPOV Treaty") and is awaiting ratification by five states, of which at
least three must have been a party to a prior version of the treaty. Amended UPOV
Treaty, reprinted in 3 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 90, 90/1-90/23 (1992).
40. Moufang, supra note 36, at 830 n.40.
41. Id. at 836.
42. Id. at 837.
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by-case analysis is required to determine if the biological parts of
the process outweigh the physical or chemical steps and the inven-
tion is unpatentable;43 and (3) that there is a distinction between a
technical process in which human intervention occurs and a biolog-
ical process which is essentially natural and uncontrollable (without
human intervention) and thus "essentially biological" means "essen-
tially without human intervention."'
Despite these uncertainties, the same Strasbourg Convention
provisions, with one major modification, were picked up in the
1973 European Patent Convention ("EPC") and signed by fourteen
European countries.45 Like the Strasbourg Convention, the EPC
defines patentable subject matter as inventions which are suscepti-
ble to industrial application, are new, and involve an inventive
step.46 Unlike the Strasbourg Convention, however, the EPC ex-
plicitly excludes patents for certain inventions:
European patents shall not be granted in respect of: (a)
43. Id.
44. Id. at 837-38.
45. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, opened for signature Munich, Oct.
5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270 [hereinafter EPC]. At the time the Commission proposed the
Directive, three Member States (Denmark, Ireland, and Portugal) had not yet ratified the
EPC. However, Denmark subsequently ratified it on October 30, 1989, Portugal on
October 14, 1991, and Ireland on May 11, 1992. The EPC provides for a single patent
application to be filed at the European Patent Office which, if granted, becomes a national
patent in each of the contracting states designated in the application. It does not grant a
supranational patent but grants a bundle of national patents in a rational centralized
system with one patent application. Victor Vandebeek, Realizing the European Communi-
ty Common Market by Unifying Intellectual Property Law: Deadline 1992, 1990 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1605, 1616. In 1975, agreement was reached on the Convention for the Europe-
an Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 15, 1975, Luxembourg, 15 I.L.M. 5 ("Communi-
ty Patent Convention"), but it has not yet been ratified by all the Member States. It
would provide for a supranational patent of a unitary character with equal effect through-
out the entire Community. However, it would merely complement the individual national
patent systems-not replace them. Vandebeek, supra, at 1614.
46. EPC, supra note 45, art. 52(1), 13 I.L.M. at 285. However, the EPC adds that
the following are not inventions: "(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical
methods; (b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental
acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers; (d) presentations of
information." Id. art. 52(2), 13 I.L.M. at 285. It further adds that "[m]ethods for treat-
ment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods
practised on the human or animal body shall not be regarded as inventions which are
susceptible of industrial application." Id. art. 52(4), 13 I.L.M. at 285-86.
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inventions, the publication or exploitation of which would
be contrary to 'ordre public' [public policy] or morality
[and] (b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals; this pro-
vision does not apply to microbiological processes or prod-
ucts thereof.47
Since most of the Member States had signed the EPC,48 the
Commission chose to build on the harmonization process begun
under the Strasbourg Convention and the EPC rather than develop
a sui generis system for protecting biotechnological inventions.49
When the Commission proposed the directive in 1988, the U.S.
Patent Office had already issued a patent on the Harvard mouse,50
and the same application was pending in the European Patent Of-
fice. The Commission was concerned that the existing legal frame-
work for protecting biotechnological inventions in the Member
States could not satisfy the needs of the patent authorities and the
courts because the underlying assumptions were outdated by scien-
tific and technological developments.5' In particular, the distinction
between microbiology and macrobiology as the dividing line be-
tween patentable and non-patentable inventions was seen as artifi-
cial and no longer tenable.52 The Commission addresses these
issues in Chapter 1 of the Amended Proposed Directive.53
B. EPO Ruling on Patenting the Harvard Mouse
While the Parliament was considering the Proposed Directive,
the European Patent Office ("EPO") ruled on the Harvard mouse
patent application. In 1989, the Examining Division of the EPO
47. Id. art. 53, 13 I.L.M. at 286.
48. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
49. Commission Memorandum, supra note 15, at 6. The Community Patent Conven-
tion, which would provide for a common, Community-wide patent had not then (and still
has not) come into force. The Commission noted that while the contracting states under
the EPC are not obligated to harmonize their national laws, this had happened on a
voluntary, unilateral, and uncoordinated basis. Id. at 18. Merely amending the EPC
would not necessarily lead to harmonization of national patent laws. Id. at 19.
50. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866, 1089 OmcIAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. 703 (Apr. 12, 1988).
51. Commission Memorandum, supra note 15, at 13.
52. Id. at 12.
53. Amended Proposed Directive, supra note 12; see also discussion infra part IL
Vol. 4:501
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("Examining Division") denied the Harvard mouse patent applica-
tion on the grounds that Article 53(b) of the EPC excludes patent
protection for animals per se, and does not merely exclude a patent
relating to a particular variety of animal.' It also ruled that where
the essence of the process invention is the introduction of an
oncogene into an animal by technical means (micro-injection), the
process is clearly not "essentially biological. '55 However, it held
that if the product-by-process is a plant or animal variety
excludable by the first part of Article 53(b), then the exception for
microbiological processes and products in the second part of the
provision cannot be interpreted as setting aside the exclusion with
respect to that product.56
In October 1990, the EPO Board of Technical Appeals ("Board
of Appeals") ruled that the language of Article 53(b) excluded only
animal varieties as such from patent protection.57 Thus, if the sub-
ject matter of a patent claim is not an animal variety, Article 53(b)
is not a bar to patentability.5"
The Board of Appeals confirmed that the process claim for the
introduction of the oncogene by technical means was not an "es-
sentially biological process. ' 59 However, it ruled that a product-by-
process claim is still a product claim, irrespective of the process to
which it refers.60 Since Article 53(b) excludes only "essentially
biological processes" for the production of animals, it is not a bar
to patenting the product of the process.6'
Further, the Board of Appeals ruled that the provision in the
second part of Article 53(b) that microbiological processes were
not excluded from patent protection was an exception to the origi-
54. Onco-mouse/Harvard, Decision of 14 July 1989, [1989] O.J.E.P.O. 11/451 (Ex-
amining Div.), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 106, E-17, E-20.
55. Id. at E-21.
56. Id.
57. Onco-mouse/Harvard, Case T-19/90, (1990] O.J.E.P.O. 12/476 (Tech. Bd. App.
1990), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 103, T 19/90-9.
58. Id. at T 19/90-10.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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nal exclusion from patent protection of "essentially biological pro-
cesses" in the first part of Article 53(b).62 Thus, "the general pat-
entability under Article 52(1) is restored for inventions involving
microbiological processes and the products of such processes. 63
Consequently, according to the Board of Appeals, animals produced
by microbiological processes are patentable."
Finally, the Board of Appeals remanded the question of whether
the invention was contrary to public policy or morality.6 The
concern was two-fold. The genetic manipulation described in the
claim caused the animal to be abnormally sensitive to carcinogenic
stimuli and prone to develop tumors and thus caused suffering.'
There was also consideration of the danger that genetically-manipu-
lated animals, if released into the environment, might have unfore-
seeable and irreversible adverse effects.67
On remand, the Examining Division concluded that an animal
variety is a sub-unit of a species, and therefore of even lower rank-
ing than a species, and that rodents or even mammals are a higher
classification unit than species.68 Accordingly, the subject-matter
of claims for patents to animals per se is not covered by the term
"animal variety," and the Harvard mouse claim is not excluded by
the Article 53(b) exclusion of animal varieties from patent protec-
tion.69 In determining whether the claim violated the Article 53(a)
62. Id. at T 19/90-11.
63. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 46-47 for general rule for patentable
inventions.
64. Onco-mouse/Harvard, Case T-19/90, [1990] O.J.E.P.O. 12/476 (Tech. Bd. App.
1990), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 103, T 19/90-11. Although the issue
of whether the claimed processes were microbiological processes was remanded to the
Examining Division, that division did not decide the question.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Onco-mouse/Harvard, Decision of 3 April 1992, [1992] O.J.E.P.O. 568 (Examin-
ing Div.), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 106, E-35, E-37; see also
Moufang, supra note 36, at 833 (noting that according to Webster's Dictionary, there is
a tendency to abandon the word "variety" on account of its indefiniteness and quoting its
definition of "variety" as narrower in scope and lower in rank than a species, i.e., a
subspecies, race, breed, strain, stock).
69. Onco-mouse/Harvard, Decision of 3 April 1992, [1992] O.J.E.P.O. 568 (Examin-
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exclusion of patents contrary to public policy or morality, the Ex-
amining Division balanced the interests of mankind in curing dis-
eases, the need to protect the environment against the uncontrolled
dissemination of unwanted genes, and the need to avoid cruelty to
animals. ° It concluded the transgenic mouse was not an invention
that was immoral or contrary to public policy since it was useful
in cancer research and thus beneficial to mankind.71
In summary, the EPO's position with respect to Article 53 is to
construe the exceptions and limitations very narrowly. Patents can
be obtained for a wide range of genetically modified organisms.
It has been suggested that EPC product protection should be avail-
able for most results of modem animal biotechnology, beginning
with animal biological material of all kinds, suchas genes, transfer
vectors, cell lines modified cells, and ending with transgenic ani-
mals.72
The Examining Division's announcement in October 1991 that
it would grant the animal patent caused an uproar in the Parlia-
ment.73 One member of Parliament suggested the apparent preemp-
tion of the Parliament's discussion might lead to the Proposed
Directive's rejection.74 Various interest groups-including animal
welfare groups, farmers, and the Patent Concern Coalition (some
thirty organizations opposed to the patenting of animals and
plants)-voiced objections to the EPO's decision.75
C. Parliament's Concerns
The Parliamentary committees 76 that examined the Proposed
ing Div.), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 106, E-35, E-37.
70. Id. at E-38.
71. Id. at E-39.
72. Joseph Straus, The Development and Status of European Law, in ANIMAL PAT-
ET 16, 23 (William H. Lesser ed., 1989).
73. Tom Wilkie, Patent for Mouse Upsets Moves to EC Harmony, THE INDEPE-
DENT, Oct. 16, 1991, at 4.
74. id.
75. Id.
76. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights was primarily responsible
for suggesting amendments to the Proposed Directive. The Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy, the Committee on Energy, Research and Technol-
ogy, and the Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development also gave their
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Directive suggested amendments that reflected the economic and
ethical concerns of a number of groups, including animal rights
activists, the "Greens," and farmers." One of the ethical concerns
was the pain and suffering of transgenic animals created by genetic
manipulation to be susceptible to disease,78 which was also an issue
addressed in granting the Harvard mouse patent.
Parliament's concern about industrial competitiveness seems to
have been less acute than the Commission's. 79 The Third Report
of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens Rights ("Third
Report") concluded that easier patentability of biotechnological
inventions is just one factor in the restructuring of the biotechnolo-
gy industry.80 It acknowledged the problems of access to biotech-
nological inventions and monopolistic powers of patent holders.8,'
It noted that the Commission and the Court of Justice have respon-
sibilities in combating efforts to secure market dominance and
82market carve-ups. With respect to the major economic conflict
of interest between the agro-chemical industry and seed producers
on one side and user/farmers on the other, the Third Report con-
cluded those problems would not be solved by special provisions
in the Directive. 3
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Indus-
trial Policy was particularly concerned with the economic power
invested in patent holders." It identified three major concerns
linked to the development of biotechnology: (1) to ensure that
opinions.
77. Third Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, EuR.
PARL. DOC. (PE 201.664/fin) 1, 3 (1992) [hereinafter Third Report].
78. id. at 31-33. The rapporteur (author of the document) also noted the arguments
that it was indefensible to reduce animals to mere units of production and that living
creatures should not be the objects of title to property, but rejected those statements as
going too far. Id. at 32.
79. The rapporteur's reaction to the Conmission's goal of maintaining international
competitiveness was that legal policy in the EEC should be more than a set of arrange-
ments for bringing about favorable conditions of competition. Id. at 27.
80. Id. at 35.
81. Id. at 35-36.
82. Id. at 36.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 47-49.
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patent protection does not mean that users are unable to exploit
new discoveries without long delay and without the cost being
prohibitive, in other words, that the patent system does not result
in market monopolies; (2) to prevent the creation of a cultural
monopoly favoring those who first obtain a patent; and (3) to en-
sure that patent regulations do not prevent action by public authori-
ties to exploit new technical possibilities if this will expedite some
of their programs. 5 It also considered the ethical issue of patenting
human beings.86 It recommended that the Proposed Directive clear-
ly exclude inventions relating to the human being as such and
which could modify the genetic identity of the individual as a
whole.8 7
In its examination of the issues raised by the Proposed Direc-
tive, the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology conclud-
ed that patent law was not the proper method of handling ethical
issues.88 It suggested that the ethical limits of research on animals
should be addressed outside of patent law.89 It concluded that
living matter should not be excluded from patent protection.' °
However, it recommended that human beings and their "constituent
parts," including human genes, cell lines, organs, and tissues,
should not be patentable.9' This exclusion would not extend to
inventions involving genetic change in human beings in order to
treat or cure disease, so long as they do not violate public policy
or human dignity.'
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Indus-
trial Property examined objections to patent protection for living
matter because of concerns about potentially adverse effects on
users. In particular, the Committee was presented with concerns
that: (1) farmers would lose their independence since they could
not use patented seeds or subsequent generations bred from them
85. Id. at 49.
86. Id. at 50.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 58.
89. Id. at 61.
90. id. at 60.
91. Id.
92. id. at 60-61.
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for their private use;93 (2) independent plant breeders would have
to pay fees for each patented gene or breeding process, leading to
a small number of genetic engineering firms rather than many
breeders;94 (3) consumers would have to pay higher prices for more
sophisticated food;95 (4) researchers would have to keep their mate-
rial secret until large genetic engineering firms filed their patent
applications, thus narrowing access to scientific information;' and
(5) that concentration among firms would be encouraged since
fewer firms would be able to stand up to multinational businesses'
mass market power.97 The Committee concluded that the economic
benefits of patent protection for living matter outweigh the draw-
backs.98 It found no evidence to bear out the assumption that only
large firms benefit from patent protection and that, on the contrary,
the absence of patent protection encourages secretiveness and de-
nies small firms access to technical advances. 99
On the other hand, the Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and
Rural Development opposed the Proposed Directive. It concluded
that the economic costs of patenting living matter and processes
outweigh the benefits1 °° It feared that such patents would intro-
duce secrecy into the research world because of restricted commu-
nication of scientific advances while corporations applied for patent
rights.' O' This committee was concerned that not only would the
payment of royalties for every generation of plant or livestock
during the life of the patent be an added burden to farmers, but
also that farmers would be faced with the problem of "patent stack-
ing," where one plant or animal could be covered by multiple pat-
ents with their separate components, each of which would give rise
to royalty payments. 0 2 Breeders and farmers would be increasingly
dependent on major chemical, pharmaceutical and food processing
93. Id. at 57.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 58.
98. Id. at 59.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 65.
101. Id. at 64.
102. Id. at 65.
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firms which would own the genes and genetic information." 3
III. PATENTABILiTY OF LIVING MATrER UNDER THE AMENDED
PROPOSED DiRECrIE
A. The Proposed Directive and Parliament's Amendments
Under the Proposed Directive, Article 2 simply read, "subject
matter of an invention shall not be considered unpatentable for the
reason only that it is composed of living matter.""°4 *The Commis-
sion intended to negate the argument that living matter is not pat-
entable only because it is a natural product. °5 Living matter is no
less patentable than non-living matter, if the required novelty, in-
ventive activity, and industrial applicability are present.)6 Further,
technology that makes use of plants, animals, and microorganisms
is patentable." 7 Moreover, the Commission concluded that inven-
tive activity in the area of human beings was excludable from pat-
ent protection on public policy grounds and thus did not need to be
mentioned specifically. 08
Parliament offered ten amendments ("Amendments") to Article
2 that, while accepting the essential premise that living matter is
patentable, limited the Commission's broad proposal."' 9 The
Amendments agree that an invention is not unpatentable only be-
cause it is "composed of, uses or is applied to biological materi-
al."' 0 Biological material is defined in the Amendments to mean
"any self-replicating living matter and any living matter capable of
being replicated through a biological system."''
However, Parliament did not leave the issue of inventions with
respect to the human body to public policy provisions. The
103. Id. at 65-66.
104. Proposed Directive, supra note 10, art. 2.
105. Commission Memorandum, supra note 15, at 32.
106. Id. at 33.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Proposal for Council Directive on the Legal Protection for Bioteclmological
Inventions, OJ. C 305/163-65 (1992) [hereinafter Parliamentary Amendments].
110. Id. amend. 13.
111. Id. amend. 14.
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Amendments specify that "[tihe human body or parts of the human
body shall not be patentable.""' 2 With respect to the treatment of
diseases, the Amendments require that "[pirocedures for surgical or
therapeutic treatment of the human or animal body and diagnostic
procedures carried out on the human or animal body not be patent-
able." ' Specifically, the Amendments state that procedures for the
genetic modification of human beings are not patentable, although
products used in such procedures are patentable. Furthermore, un-
der the Amendments, the genetic modification of human beings in
connection with the treatment of diseases is patentable, unless it
offends public policy or affects the dignity of human beings."'
In the Amendments, Parliament defined certain inventions that
it deemed to offend public policy. In language similar to Article
53(a) of the EPC,"5 Parliament provided that inventions would not
be patentable if their publication or exploitation would offend pub-
lic policy or common decency.1 6 In addition, just as the Board of
Appeals directed the Examining Division to weigh the suffering of
animals and possible risks to the environment against the useful-
ness of the invention in its remand of the Harvard mouse patent
claim," 7 Parliament would amend the Proposed Directive to require
that whether an invention offends public policy be determined on
an individual basis. Specifically, "in each particular case on the
basis of a comparative assessment in which the usefulness of the
invention on the one hand and any risks arising from it on the
other, together with any objections arising in terms of fundamental
legal principles, be taken into consideration.""'
In response to concerns over the treatment of animals, " 9 Parlia-
112. Id. amend. 15.
113. Id. amend. 20.
114. Id.
115. See supra text accompanying note 47.
116. Parliamentary Amendments, supra note 109, amend. 16.
117. Onco-mouse/Harvard, Case T-19/90, [1990] O.J.E.P.O. 12/476 (Tech. Bd. App.
1990), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB) ch. 103, T 19/90-11.
118. Parliamentary Amendments, supra note 109, amend. 17.
119. The Third Report described the suffering of the "notorious Beltsville pig,"
which was the subject of a patent application. The pigs were given a gene originating
from human genetic material which caused them to grow faster, carry less fat, and pass
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ment further specified that inventions "which involve unnatural
processes for the production or modification of animals or cause
unnecessary suffering or unnecessary physical harm to the animals
concerned" be deemed incompatible with public policy and unpat-
entable. 120 Furthermore, inventions of animals which, "owing to
the phenotype or their genetic constitution, cannot be kept without
adverse effects on their health or which are unnaturally
interspecific," be deemed incompatible with public policy and un-
patentable. 12
If an invention is not patentable under the Amendments to Pro-
posed Directive Article 2, then "a temporary universal ban on
copying the invention" is required." Thus, not only would Parlia-
ment not allow patent protection for certain inventions, it would
also limit their use.
the new gene on to their offspring. However, they also suffered from arthritis and were
more susceptible to infections. Third Report, supra note 77, at 33.
120. Parliamentary Amendments, supra note 109, amend. 18. The denial of patent
protection for inventions involving "unnatural processes for the production or modification
of animals" could end all patenting of genetically modified animals. That clause does
not, strictly speaking, provide for any balancing of interests. The denial of patent protec-
tion to inventions which cause unnecessary suffering or harm, while implying some
degree of balancing to determine what is "unnecessary" suffering, certainly invites litiga-
tion and opposition to patent claims involving genetically modified animals.
121. Id. amend. 19. Proposed amendment 19 in the Second Report of the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights included the term "chimera" in parentheses follow-
ing the term "interspecific" to explain the phrase. EUR. PARL. DOC. (PE 156.2571fin.2)
8 (1992). A chimera is made by substituting embryonic cells of one organism for some
cells in another organism's blastocyst (the last stage of embryonic development before an
embryo implants on the wall of the uterus). The technique has been used to transfer the
embryonic cells of one variety of mouse into another variety and to mix two closely
related species, i.e., a goat and a sheep, to create a geep. HOUSE COMMirTEE OF THE
JUDICIARY, TRANSGENIC ANIMAL PATENT REFORM Acr, H.R. REP. No. 888, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 34 (1988). By using the phrase "unnaturally interspecific," the rapporteur
apparently did not intend to go as far as those who would deny patent protection to any
biotechnological invention that breaches species barriers or violates species integrity, but
only those inventions that would cause "unnecessary" suffering. See supra note 120.
122. Parliamentary Amendments, supra note 109, amend. 21(1). This Temporary ban
shall remain in force until it is definitely ascertained whether exploitation is inadmissible
on the grounds of general public order considerations or for reasons relating to the safety
and protection of human beings, animals or the environment. Id. amend. 21(2).
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B. The Amended Proposed Directive
In the Amended Proposed Directive, the Commission substan-
tially revised Article 2.123 It accepted Parliament's amendment that
an invention would not be unpatentable "for the reason only that it
is composed of, uses or is applied to biological material."12 4 It
modified slightly Parliament's definition of biological material 5 to
mean "any self-replicating living matter and any matter capable of
being replicated through a biological system or by any indirect
means."1 26 Presumably, the addition of the last five words is in-
tended to assure that replication by genetic engineering techniques
would be patentable.
In its Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Amended
Proposed Directive ("Explanatory Memorandum"), 27 the Commis-
sion reversed itself on the need to include a public policy require-
ment for patentable subject matter. Acknowledging the public
controversy and Parliament's concerns since the original proposal
was published, the Commission found it essential that patent law
contain certain impassable barriers as a guide for those interpreting
the concepts of public policy and morality.121 Similar to Article
53(a) of the EPC 29 and Parliament's amendment number 16,130 the
Amended Proposed Directive provides that "[i]nventions shall be
considered unpatentable where publication or exploitation thereof
would be contrary to public policy or morality."13' However, the
Commission attempted to limit the scope of the public policy pro-
hibition with the proviso that "the exploitation shall not be deemed
to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regula-
tion in some or all of the Member States."'' 3
2
123. Amended Proposed Directive, supra note 12.
124. id. art. 2(1).
125. See Parliamentary Amendments, supra note 109, amend. 14.
126. Amended Proposed Directive, supra note 12, art. 2(2).
127. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotech-
nological Inventions, COM(92)589 final-SYN 159 [hereinafter Explanatory Memoran-
dum].
128. Id. at 4.
129. See EPC, supra note 45, art. 53(a).
130. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
131. Amended Proposed Directive, supra note 12, art. 2(3).
132. Id. (emphasis added).
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The Commission specified three categories of inventions that
would be unpatentable because they are contrary to public policy
or morality:
(a) the human body or parts of the human body per se;
(b) processes for modifying the genetic identity of the
human body for a non-therapeutic purpose which is
contrary to the dignity of man;
(c) processes for modifying the genetic identity of ani-
mals which are likely to inflict suffering or physical
handicaps upon them without any benefit to man or
animal. 133
In its Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Amended
Proposed Directive, the Commission said that the exclusion from
patentability of "parts of the human body per se" in Article 2(3)(a)
is intended to apply to "parts of the human body as found inside
the human body."'' 4 The language is intended to remove all ambi-
guity with respect to patents already granted, for example: patents
for a human cell line; recombinant DNA molecules; molecular
cloning and characterization of gene sequence coding processes;
and particular processes for producing human antibody and human
protein.1 35 The Explanatory Memorandum's statement that "a mere
part of the 'human body' per se, e.g., a human gene neither the
function of which nor the protein for which it codes is known," is
excluded from patentability, 36 appears to be a statement that would
block NIH's attempt to patent human gene fragments, 37 not on the
basis of the lack of usefulness, but rather because they were parts
of the human body per se. 38
In Article 2(3)(b), 139 the Commission revised Parliament's
133. Id.
134. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 127, at 7.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
138. See Julian Thurston, Recent EC Developments in Biotechnology, 6 E.I.P.R. 187
(1993).
139. Amended Proposed Directive, supra note 12, art. 2(3)(b).
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Amendments' 4° to ensure that inventions that modify the genetic
identity of human beings and that improve the lives of persons
suffering from serious illness would 'be patentable. 41 Thus, the
requirement that a process for modifying the genetic identity of
human beings conform to the principle of the "dignity of man" was
coupled with the requirement that the process be therapeutic so that
processes for eugenics would not be patentable."
In Amended Proposed Directive Article 8, the Commission
added the language found in Article 52(4) of the EPC, 143 that
"[m]ethods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery
or therapy and diagnostic methods practised on the human or ani-
mal body shall not be patentable," although it specified that this
prohibition would "not apply to products, in particular substances
or compositions, for use in any of these methods."' 144 The prohibi-
tion is in a separate article from the public policy provisions of
Article 2 because the Commission intended to distinguish biotech-
nological processes meeting the ethical requirement of having a
therapeutic purpose in keeping with the dignity of man from meth-
ods of treatment which are not patentable under the EPC.' 45 An
invention which meets the ethical test of having a therapeutic pur-
pose in keeping with the dignity of man would nonetheless not be
patentable if it were a method of treatment.146 Conversely, an in-
vention of a product that was not excluded by Article 8, might still
be unpatentable if it violated the ethical requirements of Article
2(3)(b).147
140. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
141. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 127, at 8.
142. Amended Proposed Directive supra note 12, 2(3)(b); see also Explanatory
Memorandum, supra note 127, at 9.
143. See EPC, supra note 45, art. 52(4). Similar language was also included in the
Parliamentary Amendments. See supra text accompanying notes 113-114.
144. Amended Proposed Directive, supra note 12, art. 8.
145. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 127, at 9; see also Thurston, supra note
138, at 188 (critical analysis of Proposed Amended Directive and Explanatory Memoran-
dum in which author suggests that qualifying language "contrary to the dignity of man,"
seems to apply whether or not purpose is non-therapeutic).
146. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 127, at 9.
147. Id.
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While the Commission accepted, in part, Parliament's Amend-
ments with respects to patents relating to humans, it rejected the
numerous amendments limiting animal patents. 48 Instead, in Arti-
cle 2(3)(c) it provided a minimal balancing test, along the lines of
the test used in EPO's Harvard mouse decision, 4 9 where processes
modifying the genetic identity of an animal may cause suffering.
50
The Commission pointed to other laws that regulate the treatment
of research animals.' The Commission further emphasized that
the patent directive was not the place to regulate biotechnology
research by including in the Amended Proposed Directive a provi-
sion that the Directive would "not affect national and Community
laws on the monitoring of the applications of research and of the
use or commercialization of its results."' 52
One of the Commission's original goals was to provide clear
and improved standards of patentability.' Thus, under the origi-
nal Proposed Directive, it set out specific definitions of what would
be patentable:
Micro-organisms, biological classifications other than plant
or animal varieties as well as parts of plant and animal vari-
eties other than propagating material... protectable under
plant variety protection law shall be considered patentable
subject matter. Claims for classifications higher than variet-
ies shall not be affected by any rights granted in respect of
plant and animal varieties. 54
148. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
149. Onco-mouse/Harvard, Decision of 3 April 1992, [1992] O.J.E.P.O. 568 (Exam-
ining Div.), reprinted in 5 Eur. Pat. Handbook (MB), ch. 106, E-35.
150. Amended Proposed Directive, supra note 12, art. 2(3).
151. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 127, at 10-12.
152. Amended Proposed Directive, supra note 12, art. 2(4).
153. See supra text accompanying note 23.
154. Proposed Directive, supra note 10, art. 3(1). Article 3 also clarifies the distinc-
tion between the rights protected under the plant varieties protection system, UPOV
Treaty, supra note 39, and patent claims. Patent protection for plant material which is
not a variety is enforceable, even with respect to finished varieties incorporating patented
inventions. Thus, patents on new plant characteristics, such as insect, disease, and herbi-
cide resistance, are allowed. Plants, parts of plants such as genetic sequences, and classi-
fications other than varieties are protected by patent. Where a patented genetic sequence
is incorporated into an existing variety to produce a new variety with a new characteristic,
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Essentially, under the Proposed Directive, patents were prohibit-
ed only for animals, plants, and plant propagating material in the
genetically fixed form of a plant or animal variety.' 5 According
to the Commission, the Proposed Directive provides no justification
for not permitting a patent for an invention concerning plant or
animal matter which is not a variety, such as plant or animal cells,
cell lines, tissue cultures, and larger parts. 56 In its Amendments to
the Proposed Directive, however, Parliament had only gone so far
as to say that "[b]iological material, including plants and animals,
as well as parts of plants and animals, except plant and animal
varieties as such" would be patentable to the extent allowed by the
patent law in the Member States. 57 Ultimately, the Commission
chose to forego the benefits of specificity and accepted Parlia-
ment's amendment, but without the reference to Member State
law.158
The Commission rejected Parliament's amendment to Article 4,
which would have provided patent protection for the "[u]ses of
plant or animal varieties or of processes for their production, other
than essentially biological processes."' 5 9 According to the Commis-
sion's analysis, the three types of inventions traditionally protected
by patents-product, process, and application (or use) inven-
tions-correspond to biotechnological inventions relating to an
organism or material as such, a process for the creation of a living
organism, and the use of an organism or other biological material.
Thus, while plant and animal varieties as such are not patentable,
the other two types of biotechnological inventions may be patented
if they relate: (a) to a process that is not essentially biological; or
the patent rights in the genetic sequence are not extinguished. In short, the patent system
is not hindered by the plant varieties protection system. Commission Memorandum,
supra note 15, at 36.
155. Commission Memorandum, supra note 15, at 34.
156. Id.
157. Parliamentary Amendments, supra note 109, amend. 22. This amendment
would allow the Member States to enact their own limits to the patentability of biological
materials. It would also defeat the intent of the directive to remove any barriers to trade
within the community, and would encourage cross-border investment by providing com-
mon rules for patent protection.
158. Amended Proposed Directive, supra note 12, art. 3.
159. Id. art. 4.
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(b) to the use of the plant or animal variety t6°
Parliament, however, would not specifically permit a "use"
patent for biological material. It would provide only that proce-
dures for the production of biological material, except for essential-
ly biological procedures for breeding plants or animals and for the
production of plant or animal varieties, would be patentable to the
extent allowed by the different Member States.!( The intent was
to exclude processes for the production of plant or animal varieties
from patentability, rather than to include them as provided by the
Proposed Directive. 62 In rejecting Parliament's amendment, the
Commission pointed out that Article 4 would not deal with pro-
cesses for the production of biological material, but only with the
patentability of inventions using plant or animal varieties or of the
processes for their production. 63
The laws of most Member States reflect the EPC's language,
excluding "essentially biological processes" from patent protection
but protecting microbiological processes.1 64 The Proposed Directive
clarified the meaning of "microbiological processes"1 65 stating that
"[m]icrobiological processes shall be considered patentable subject
matter. For purposes of this Directive, this term shall be taken to
mean and to include a process (or processes) carried out with the
use of or performed upon or resulting in a micro-organism."'
66
A microbiological process was defined as a process in which
the essence of the invention is incorporated in one or more micro-
biological steps of the process.' 67 Thus, a multi-step process in
which the essence of the invention is incorporated in a microbio-
logical step was not denied patent protection simply because the
160. Commission Memorandum, supra note 15, at 37.
161. Parliamentary Amendments, supra note 109, amend. 23.
162. Third Report, supra note 77, at 39.
163. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 127, at 13.
164. Commission Memorandum, supra note 15, at 37.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 36-44. As originally drafted, the underlying
motive behind the phrase was to exclude the results of traditional breeding processes
using plants and animals from patent protection. Commission Memorandum, supra note
15, at 38.
166. Proposed Directive, supra note 10, art. 5.
167. id. art. 6.
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process contains other, non-microbiological steps.168 Without this
guideline, regeneration of a single genetically engineered cell to
produce an entire plant might well have been considered an "essen-
tially biological" process.' 69 Parliament would simply provide that
if one step in a process were microbiological, the process would be
treated as a microbiological process.1
7 0
In the Amended Proposed Directive, the Commission modified
the definition of a microbiological process to mean "a process
involving or performed upon or resulting in microbiological materi-
al."' 7 ' It also adopted Parliament's more specific requirement that
"one essential step" be microbiological. 7 2
Because "essentially biological processes" are not patentable,
the extent to which human intervention is necessary to ensure that
an invention is patentable was also described. As discussed, a
major consideration here is the distinction between traditional
breeding activities and other forms of human intervention in bio-
logical matter.173 Under the original Proposed Directive, where
"human intervention consists in more than selecting an available
biological material and letting it perform an inherent biological
function under natural conditions," the process was patentable.' 4
Thus, the Commission specified that any human intervention other
than selection would remove a process from the field of "essential-
ly biological processes," and make it patentable. This standard was
in contrast with the EPO's examination guidelines ("EPO Guide-
lines"), which require that human intervention must play a signifi-
cant part in determining the result. 5 Parliament would have the
168. Commission Memorandum, supra note 15, at 40.
169. Robin Whaite & Nigel Jones, Biotechnological Patents in Europe-The Draft
Directive, 5 E.I.P.R. 145, 149 (1989).
170. Parliamentary Amendments, supra note 109, amend. 24. Both the Parliament's
amendment and the Commission's proposal required a determination of what is essential
to, or the essence of, the invention.
171. Amended Proposed Directive, supra note 12, art. 5(1).
172. Id. art. 5(2).
173. Commission Memorandum, supra note 15, at 40.
174. Proposed Directive, supra note 10, art. 7.
175. Commission Memorandum, supra note 15, at 40-41; see also EUROPEAN PAT-
ENT OFFICE. GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (1992).
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standard of human intervention that makes a procedure technical
rather than biological closer to that of the EPO by requiring the
nature of the intervention to be examined, having regard to its
extent and its impact on the results. 176
The Commission adopted the "facts and circumstances" ap-
proach of Parliament with respect to the nature and extent of hu-
man intervention that makes a process non-biological and thus
patentable. However, it also specified that "[a] process which,
taken as a whole, does not exist in nature and is more than a mere
production process," would be patentable.' 77
Biotechnological techniques permit many natural substances to
be selected and adapted for industrial, commercial, and medical
uses. A biotechnological invention may also consist of the identifi-
cation of a naturally occurring substance and its isolation in a us-
able form which does not exist in nature. The natural material is
thus changed by human intervention, and the product claimed for
patent purposes is not the same as that which exists in nature. 78
The Proposed Directive would have provided that "an invention,
including a mixture, which formed an unseparated part of a pre-
existing material, shall not be considered unpatentable for the rea-
son that it formed part of said natural material;"'179 nor would it "be
considered as an unpatentable discovery or as lacking novelty for
the reason only that it formed part of said natural material."'8' The
Commission intended to make clear that where a patent is claimed
for a substance in a form which results from human intervention,
it is more than mere discovery, irrespective of whether the inter-
vention is simple or complex. A product is considered new if it
does not form part of the "state of the art," that is, if the product
was available to the public before the patent application was
176. Parliamentary Amendments, supra note 109, amend. 25.
177. Amended Proposed Directive, supra note 12, art. 6.
178. Commission Memorandum, supra note 15, at 42. The products here are likely
to be other than living organisms, e.g., plasmids, DNA segments, proteins, peptides,
enzymes, etc. Id.
179. Proposed Directive, supra note 10, art. 8.
180. Id. art. 9.
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filed. '8 That a product may have existed in a mixture before its
identification, isolation, purification, and usefulness have been
established does not make it part of the state of the art for purposes
of patent law. 18 2 On this point, Parliament would provide in Article
2 that discoveries are not inventions, in spite of the fact that Parlia-
ment makes no distinction between "inventions" and "discover-
ies. ,,18
3
Again, in the Proposed Amended Directive, the Commission
backed off from its more detailed definitions, but it attempted to
limit the denial of patent claims on the grounds the invention is
merely a discovery of an existing material. Article 7 of the
Amended Proposed Directive would provide that an invention con-
cerning a biological material "shall not be considered a discovery
or lacking in novelty for the reason only that, although not known,
it formed part of an existing material.' 84
CONCLUSION
The issues relating to patenting living matter illustrate how
economic and ethical concerns can become intertwined. When the
Commission issued the Proposed Directive in 1988, controversy
swirled around patenting animals, with implications for the growth
and development of the pharmaceutical and agricultural industries.
The primary goal was to provide for a single internal market so
that industries could market and invest freely across European
borders. By providing uniform guidelines for national laws
throughout the EEC through specific definitions and minimum
standards, the Proposed Directive provided the foundation for
achieving that goal. However, by codifying additional ethical crite-
ria for patentability, the Amended Proposed Directive introduces
more uncertainty and ambiguity into patent law. Although the
181. Commission Memorandum, supra note 15, at 43.
182. Id.
183. Parliamentary Amendments, supra note 109, amend. 47; see generally R. Ste-
phen Crespi, Inventiveness in Biological Chemistry: An International Perspective, 73 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 351 (1991).
184. Amended Proposed Directive, supra note 12, art. 7.
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public policy provision in Article 53(a) of the EPC is part of the
law of the Member States,'85 as one author noted, the EPO Guide-
lines indicate the article was intended to apply only in rare and
extreme situations,8 6 and the paucity of case law before the Har-
vard mouse decision indicated its limited relevance.8 7 Article 2(3)
of the Amended Proposed Directive, however, expands on the cate-
gories of inventions that are contrary to public policy, 88 and it
clearly is not limited to rare situations. Importing ethical concepts
into patent law increases the uncertainty of attaining patent protec-
tion for biotechnology inventions.189 The Commission gave as a
reason for limiting the public policy provisions in the Amended
Proposed Directive the fact that national laws already existed to
regulate biotechnology research and included Article 2(4) to specif-
ically acknowledge the primacy of national laws in regulating re-
search and its products.' 90 Although perhaps politically necessary,
these provisions severely compromise the goal of having a single
internal market for the biotechnology industry in the EEC.
These provisions also undermine the goal of achieving parity in
patent protection vis-A-vis the United States. Although the Com-
missioner of the USPTO has announced that only non-human ani-
mals are considered patentable,' 9' U.S. patent law itself does not
contain public policy criteria and moral standards of patentability,
nor are human and animal material mentioned.' 9 The lack of spec-
ificity in the American law has provided the flexibility to meet the
challenges of new technology.'93 By starting with the premise that
an invention is not unpatentable only because it is composed of
185. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
186. Cynthia M. Ho, Note, Building a Better Mousetrap: Patenting Biotechnology
in the European Community, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 173, 189 (1992).
187. Id. at 197.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 133-147.
189. See Thurston, supra note 138, at 188; Ho, supra note 186, at 195-199.
190. See supra text accompanying note 152.
191. See supra text accompanying note 2.
192. See Robert A. Armitage, The Emerging U.S. Patent Law for the Protection of
Biotechnology Research Results, 11 E.I.P.R. 47, 48-50 (1989).
193. See generally U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OFTECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BIOTECH-
NOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 203-25 (1991).
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living matter, broadly defining patentability microbiological pro-
cesses and products, and strictly limiting exceptions to patentability
that exist in the law, the Proposed Directive would have achieved
a level of protection of biotechnological inventions comparable to
that of the United States. 194 However, in specifying that the human
body and its parts are not patentable, the Proposed Amended Direc-
tive immediately raises the issue of what is a part of the human
body. The Explanatory Memorandum does not clarify the mat-
ter.' 95 In the meantime, harmonization is becoming more difficult,
politically speaking,' 96 as Member States enact laws' 97 and issue
guidelines' with respect to patenting human and animal materials.
It should be noted in connection with international parity that
case law in a number of areas relating to patent protection for bio-
technological inventions is unsettled in the United States. For
example, the question of the degree of human intervention that
takes a product out of the unpatentable category of product of na-
ture is not answered in the United States.' 99 Furthermore, in the
area of process patent protection, European law appears to provide
greater protection to patent applicants than the United States.2°°
This is particularly significant since process patent protection is the
sort of protection that is more likely to support the development of
194. See Straus, supra note 72, at 27.
195. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 127; see, e.g., Thurston, supra note 138,
at 187.
196. See Gary Moss & Simon Cohen, New EC Draft On Biotech Inventions, BUS.
LAW BRIEF, Feb. 1993 (predicting a draft will not be adopted before 1995).
197. See Robin Herman, France Defines the Ethics of High-Tech Medicine Law
Drafted by Female Jurist Covers Fertility Treatment, Organ Donation, Gene Therapy,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 20, 1993, at Z8 (specifying that human genes are not patentable and
that genes cannot be manipulated to change the genetic blueprint, but only to improve
health).
198. See Clive Cookson, Guidelines May Be Set Up For Human Genetics Research,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1992, at 8 (United Kingdom considering terms under which re-
searchers could patent human genes and exploit them commercially).
199. See Crespi, supra note 183.
200. See generally Phillip B.C. Jones, Patentability of the Products and Processes
of Biotechnology, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 372 (1991); Harold C. Wegner,
Biotechnology Process Patents: Judicial or Legislative Remedy, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 24 (1991); Linda Maher, The Patent Environment: Domestic and European
Community Frameworks for Biotechnology, 33 JURIMETRICS J. 67, 83-93 (1992).
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more biotechnological products.2 1
As noted earlier, patent protection and public acceptance are
two conditions critical to the development of the biotechnology
industry. 2°2 The applications for patents on human gene fragments
have brought into sharper focus the economic and ethical issues
relating to the patentability of living matter in both the United
States20 3 and the EEC. For instance, Stephen Raines, vice president
at Genentech, has suggested that privatization of the gene search
could lead to a sort of toll system for the human genome. 204 Dr.
David Botstein, chairman of the genetics department at Stanford
University, fears that companies owning a library of gene frag-
ments would be able to lay claim to the work of scientists who do
the hard work of finding out what the genes actually do.205 Dr.
Richard Sykes, research director at Glaxo, notes that "[t]he only
thing some biotechnology companies have is their intellectual prop-
erty so they patent everything in sight. That inhibits research." 206
Reports that the institution that patented the gene whose defect
causes cystic fibrosis is seeking royalties from those using it in
research to treat and cure the disease give credence to such fears.207
A few laboratories churning out gene fragments about whose func-
tion they know little could gain too much control over products to
which they had contributed little, and thus defeat the purpose of the
patent system to reward innovation.
Indeed, it has been reported that after the patent applications for
human gene fragments were filed, some researchers in the Human
Genome Project stopped sharing their data as they were supposed
to do.208 Questions have been raised as to whether patent protec-
201. See Frank Y. Tang, Note, Recent Development of Patent Law Protection for
Products of Genetic Engineering in Great Britain: Genentech Inc.'s Patent for TPA, 15
SYRACUSE J. Ir'L L. & CoM. 125 (1988).
202. See supra text accompanying note 19.
203. See generally Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New
Animal Life, 28 JuRiMETRCS J. 399 (1987-1988).
204. Kolata, supra note 5.
205. Id.
206. Clive Cookson, Gene Therapy For an Industry's Health: Clive Cookson on UK
Efforts in a Crucial Area of Research, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1993, at 9.
207. Tom Wilkie, Royalties Demand Threatens Research into Cystic Fibrosis, THE
INDEPENDENT, Jan. 14, 1993, at 8.
208. Declan Butler, Who Owns the Building Blocks of Life?, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov.
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tion is in fact the best system creating incentives for creating valu-
able inventions or whether a sui generis form of protection should
be created.2' 9
In order to assure the availability of information and to encour-
age the development of biotechnological inventions that improve
the health of mankind, the United States and EEC, as well as other
governments, should heed the call of science210 and industry 1 ' for
an international agreement on the patentability of human material.
2, 1992, at 14. Charles Auffray, a leading French human genome researcher, handed over
French research results on the human genome project to UNESCO in Paris in protest
against American and British attempts to patent fragments of human genes. More than
200 genome scientists from around the world also signed a declaration calling for the
results of the Human Genome Project to be freely accessible to all. Id.
209. Dennis S. Karjala, A Legal Research Agenda for the Human Genome Initiative,
32 JuRYMTCS J. 121, 192-203 (1991-92). See generally Yusing Ko, An Economic
Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777, 791-804 (1992) (analyz-
ing incentives and patent scope and concluding traditional patent doctrine should be
updated to accommodate modem technological innovations).
210. See Butler, supra note 208 (describing the French hope that the declaration will
lead to an international agreement); Amanda Husted, Health Watch Combination of Blood
Tests May Spot Down's Syndrome, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 27, 1992, at D3 (citing
an article by Dr. Bernadine Healy in the August issue of the New England Journal of
Medicine).
211. Kolata, supra note 5 (citing Richard D. Godown, President of the Industrial
Biotechnology Association, as saying there should be an international agreement that gene
fragments cannot be patented).
